Behavioural impacts of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems–an overview by Brookhuis, Karel A. et al.
Behavioural impacts of Advanced Driver Assistance
Systems–an overview
Karel A. Brookhuis*, Dick de Waard* and Wiel H. Janssen**
* Department of Psychology
University of Groningen
Groningen
The Netherlands
** TNO Human Factors
Soesterberg
The Netherlands
EJTIR, 1, no. 3 (2001), pp. 245 - 253
Received: June 2001
Accepted: November 2001
The purpose of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) is that driver error will be
reduced or even eliminated, and efficiency in traffic and transport is enhanced. The benefits
of ADAS implementations are potentially considerable because of a significant decrease in
human suffering, economical cost and pollution. However, there are also potential problems
to be expected, since the task of driving a ordinary motor vehicle is changing in nature, in
the direction of supervising a (partly) automated moving vehicle.
1. Introduction
There are a number of reasons why in recent years electronic driving aids are developed and
implemented at an increasing rate and speed. The first and foremost reason is safety (i.e. the
unacceptable number of accidents), but also economic principles (time is money, among
others) are a compelling drive, while bringing comfort to the driver population is obviously a
good sales argument. Last but not least, environmental arguments play a role of growing
importance.
1.1. Accident causes
Safety is primarily a ‘human factors’ case. Driver impairment is the first cause of accidents
on (European) motorways. Based on a literature survey, Smiley and Brookhuis (1987) stated
that about 90% of all traffic accidents are to be attributed to human failure, for instance,
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through fatigue, inattention or drowsiness at the wheel. According to Vallet (1991) it is
generally a loss of alertness, which is the principal cause of fatal accidents (34%). While
some suggest that alcohol is in at least 20% of all accidents the “prime causative factor”, at
least during the weekend, fatigue as “single factor” is estimated to be responsible for 7-10%
of all accidents (Tunbridge et al., 2000). The costs of road traffic accidents for society are
enormous in terms of both human suffering and economical loss. In Europe alone around
50.000 people are killed in traffic accidents each year, while more than 1.500.000 are
injured. Traffic congestion, i.e. the regular ones and following traffic accidents, is a daily
nuisance, predominantly present in the economically most sensitive places. At least 70
Billion Euro’s are spent each year on medical treatment of injured people, the cost of
congestion is many times that amount, and many thousands of person-years of work are lost.
1.2 Accident causation
Tunbridge et al. (2000) argue that examination of accidents’ most prevailing factors shows,
perhaps not surprisingly, the two most common “What happened?” factors being loss of
control and failing to avoid a vehicle in the carriageway (i.e. a collision). The distribution of
contributory factors is also interesting. These factors can be hierarchically categorised as
representing Driver (error & impairment), Environment, and Vehicle factors contributing to
accidents (Shinar, 1998). The incidence of these factors is revealing. The incidence of
alcohol was established at 3.8%, which is very close to that for all accidents in England
where a driver is known to be over the drink drive limit (4.2%). For the other impairment
related factors the situation is not so straightforward.  Impairment due to fatigue is recorded
as a factor in only 0.8% of accidents, whereas in-depth studies and a large volume of
anecdotal evidence shows that this factor is more like 7-10%. This under-representation of
fatigue related accidents is now well recognised and results largely from the absence of direct
evidence of sleepiness or tiredness being a factor. There is no quantitative measure of this
effect on drivers. If drivers survive an accident caused by sleepiness they are unlikely to
admit it; if they do not survive there is often very little direct physical evidence. Other factors
e.g. vehicle defects, which are often erroneously cited as causes, usually need to be
eliminated before fatigue becomes apparent.
1.3 Electronic aids
The prevention or reduction of traffic accidents requires countermeasures that have to be
devised and introduced to prevent those behaviours contributing to accidents. In Europe, the
USA and Japan, combined ergonomic and engineering approaches to both hazard assessment
and the indication of drivers’ performance limits have developed into research and
development of new and relevant (primary) safety measures. Brookhuis & Brown (1992)
argue that an ergonomic approach to behavioural change via engineering measures, in the
form of electronic driving aids, needs to be adopted in order to improve road safety, transport
efficiency and environmental quality.
Driver comfort appears to be a strong impetus for the development of electronic driving aids
as well, at least from a marketing point of view. Car manufacturers are keen on driver
comfort and invest considerable effort in the development and improvement of comfort
enhancing electronic aids. Well-known examples of this type of applications are navigation
or route guidance systems and advanced cruise control systems. Though expensive,
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prototypes of this type of systems passed a number of tests (and improvements) and were
successfully placed on the consumer market. Before the actual marketing, user needs
research (or marketing research) is indispensable, but also studies on acceptance and
certainly safety effects are still necessary after implementation. Consumer acceptance is
dependent upon such requirements as system safety, validity (does the system function
correctly) and benefit (is there a positive cost-benefit balance). Finally, environmental issues
are not decisive in this area yet, but will gain weight in the future.
2. Advanced Driver Assistance Systems
What is now called ADAS (Advanced Driver Assistance Systems) is to be considered as the
collection of systems and subsystems on the way to a fully automated highway system, if
ever realised (ADASE project deliverables, 1998). Only when on a fully automated traffic
lane, the vehicle can be operated under fully automated control, which is very similar to the
automatic pilot in aeroplanes (Congress, 1994), bailing out the human factor. ADAS
concepts include among others blind spot detectors, Adaptive Cruise Control, Autonomous
Intelligent Cruise Control, platoon driving, etc., in general AVG (Automated Vehicle
Guidance). Some of the technology is available on the market, or ready to be marketed, some
is developed but as a prototype still under test. A prototype fully automated traffic lane exists
in the USA near San Diego, including a limited number of vehicles running on the lane, for
testing and demonstrating purposes. A similar demonstration including many more separate
ADAS applications was organised in the Netherlands in 1998.
2.1 History
ADAS has a considerable history. In Europe several car manufacturers and research institutes
started the Prometheus initiative, around 1986. A series of projects was carried out under this
umbrella, most of them aiming at practical solutions to urban traffic problems. The European
Union initiated the DRIVE (Dedicated Road Infrastructure for Vehicle safety in Europe)
program shortly thereafter, in which a considerable number of projects tackled practical
problems as well as fundamental issues. An example of the latter is the GIDS (Generic
Intelligent Driver Support) project, the largest project in DRIVE 1, ahead of it’s time and still
relevant (Michon, 1993). The overall objective of this ambitious project was “to determine
the requirements and design standards for a class of intelligent driver support systems which
will conform with the information requirements and performance capabilities of the
individual drivers”. On the one hand this class of systems will aid the driver’s detection and
assessment of road and traffic hazards, on the other they will provide guidance on the
driver’s ability to deal with specific hazards.
2.2 Benefits and functionality
Thus, the purpose of ADAS is that driver error will be reduced or even eliminated and
efficiency is enhanced. The benefits of ADAS implementations are potentially great because
of a significant decrease in human suffering, economical cost and pollution, since (cf.,
Congress, 1994):
248 Behavioural Impacts of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems
 driving safety will be considerably enhanced;
 many more vehicles can be accommodated, on regular highways but especially on
dedicated lanes;
 high-performance driving can be conducted without regard to vision, weather and
environmental conditions;
 drivers using ADAS can be safe and efficient drivers (cf. elderly, inexperienced drivers).
Primary functionality of ADAS is to facilitate the task performance of drivers by providing
real-time advice, instruction and warnings. This type of systems is usually also described by
the term “co-driver systems” or “driver support systems”. Driver support systems may
operate in advisory, semi-automatic or automatic mode (e.g. Rosengren, 1995), all of which
may have different consequences for the driving task, and with that on traffic safety.
Although the purpose of a driver support system is to have a positive effect on traffic safety,
adverse effects have been shown on driver behaviour, indicative of negative effects on traffic
safety (Zwahlen, Adams and DeBald, 1988, Van Winsum, 1997). Firstly, the provision of
information potentially leads to a situation where the driver's attention is diverted from
traffic. Secondly, taking over (part of) the driving task by a co-driver system may well
produce behavioural adaptation. As a result, either the driver might not (or too late) be aware
of a sudden hazard, or, is not fit (anymore) c.q. not ready for an adequate reaction. Before
introducing any driver support system, the consequences of system operation in this sense
should be identified.
A specific source of problems with the development of driver support systems that are
intended to reduce accidents is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to forecast the
savings of death and disability that might result from the introduction of such systems.
Although there is an urgent need to know what the effects are of introducing a specific
system before it enters the market, no data exist on which estimates of the benefits and the
risks of system-specific traffic behaviour can be based. The only type of effects that can be
studied is effects on behavioural aspects of the driving task per se. These aspects should be
selected on the basis of known adverse effects on traffic safety, such as insufficient safety
margins in lateral and longitudinal positioning (cf., Rumar, 1988). Hence, each individual
IVIS application should be subjected to a test on behavioural effects before marketing, in
order to pinpoint both beneficial and unwanted side effects at the behavioural level. For this,
however, exact criteria still have to be developed (Brookhuis et al., submitted). Eventually,
traffic safety effects are confined to an extrapolation from these test results then.
3. Problems with ADAS
User needs in road transport in a general sense stem from unsatisfactory conditions. The
reason could be in (physical) working conditions, causing fatigue and health problems, or
traffic safety. In the past many studies have been done in this area into the driving conditions
of professional drivers. Ouwerkerk (1986), for instance, in a survey among studies as known
at that time reported that more 50% of the professional drivers admitted falling asleep and/or
having had near-accidents. These numbers were found for both lorry- and bus-drivers. In the
present time of electronic driving aids, solving the need for support to avoid accidents is
thought to be realised through ADAS.
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However, there are also potential problems to be expected. For instance, increased
complexity of the “cockpit” increases the likelihood of failure by the driver, and of at least
one of the system’s components, either by ‘spontaneous’ failure or by design errors (Janssen,
Wierda & Van der Horst, 1992). The latter requires additional alertness of the driver, while
at the same time driver alertness in general and attention for the driving task per se is
decreasing in case of automation of the driving task (Brookhuis & De Waard, 1993).
Electronic driving aids can be considered to operate in different modes, from noncommittal
information supply via active support at driver’s will to leaving control to technology
completely. Not surprisingly, acceptance varies with driver control (Bekiaris, Petica &
Brookhuis, 1997); taking the driver out of the loop is considered a problem by many
(potential) end-users. The views with respect to the different modes may well be different for
different stakeholders such as the authorities, the general public and the end-users including
professionals.
One of the most important characteristics of electronic in-car technologies is to provide
information to drivers. Not only through different types of messages located in the road
environment, but also by their integration inside the vehicle, through different types of
devices. It is clear that a poorly designed system inside vehicles can adversely affect the
different actors, or more generally, the social benefits associated with the system (Bekiaris,
Petica & Brookhuis, 1997). However, ADAS devices that are limited to supplying
information are most likely to meet a priori acceptance. Examples are route guidance
systems, traffic jam warning systems, autonomous intelligent cruise control, driver
monitoring systems and complete automatic highway systems.
Several reservations that have consequences for acceptance by the relevant stakeholders,
hold for any of these modes. A few studies found support for compliance, i.e. excessive
reliance on automated (ADAS) systems, others reported deterioration in driving
performance. This and other forms of behavioural adaptation, or compensation as it is called
in a wider field, are factors that should be taken into account when investigating the
conditions for introduction of ADAS (Verwey, Brookhuis & Janssen, 1996).
3.1 Behavioural changes
Automation may increase reaction time. In case of continuous monitoring, reaction time to
events in a driving task can be restricted to something like one second, while if more than
one functions have to be monitored and other tasks are attended to, awareness of the situation
has to be refreshed with increased frequency. At the same time, possible malfunction and its
origin have to be determined which might take many seconds. In this way, an attempt to
reduce workload is actually very likely to lead to increased workload (Hancock &
Parasuraman, 1992). There are also several studies that have shown that monitoring of
systems for malfunctions during prolonged periods of time induce high levels of workload,
despite the fact that information processing requirements for these tasks are low in itself.
Humans are poor ‘process monitors’ (e.g., Molloy & Parasuraman, 1996) and enforced
vigilance in the operational environment is very stressful (Hancock & Parasuraman, 1992).
An adaptable interface between human and machine is proposed that dynamically allocates
tasks to these two and maintains an appropriate and tolerable load on the operator. Research
on adaptive task allocation shows that temporarily returning control to the human operator at
the right moment, i.e. when the driver is ready for it, has favourable effects on detection of
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automation failures during subsequent automation control (Parasuraman et al., 1996). Many
of these aspects are subject to research in the early new millennium.
3.2 Human supervision
The classic goal of automation is to replace human manual control, planning and problem
solving by automatic devices. However, these systems still need human beings for
supervision and adjustment. It has been suggested that the more advanced a control system,
the more crucial is the contribution of the human operator (Bainbridge, 1983).
The point made by Bainbridge (1983) is as follows: normal operation is performed
automatically, abnormal conditions are to be dealt with manually. Unfortunately, as a result
of automation, experience is limited, while in case of abnormal conditions (i.e., something is
wrong with the process) unusual actions will be required. Also, human problem solving is
not optimal under time-pressure.
Monitoring of (present) automatic processes is based on skills that formerly manual
operators have, and that future generations of operators (/drivers) cannot be expected to have
(Bainbridge, 1983). Pilots also indicated that although automation reduced workload, it also
had a negative effect on flying skills. They considered manually flying of a part of every trip
important to maintain these skills (McClumpha et al., 1991).
3.3 Complacency
When a system fails to work or is in a state that failure is possible, feedback should be
provided in order to let the driver know that s/he can not rely on the system. The main reason
for this is that automated systems can and will lead to what has been called ‘complacency’
(Wiener and Curry, 1980). Complacency is an attitude of (over)reliance on an automated
system. In a test of reaction time to a system failure cue, Knapp and Vardaman (1991) found
support for complacency, i.e. the reaction time to this cue increased compared to normal task
performance. Ward et al. (1995) also found evidence for complacency, poor lane position
control and failure to yield to other traffic was more frequently observed in drivers driving a
car with AICC compared to drivers driving a normal car.
3.4 Acceptance/attitude towards ADAS
A basic question in ADAS implementation is acceptance of ADAS, i.e. giving up parts of the
direct control over the vehicle. For instance, take-over of control in case of short headway to
a lead car was less appreciated than warnings or suggestions of the appropriate action in a
test of different types of Collision Avoidance Systems (Nilsson & Alm, 1991). Although
drivers expect a positive safety effect by this type of anti-collision systems and other forms
of ADAS, they have at the same time reservations against it. Handing over control to a
device and the automated braking function are evaluated as negative aspects of ADAS
systems (Hoedemaeker, 1996, Hoedemaeker & Brookhuis, 1999). Complete take-over in
specific circumstances has been tested as well. The SAVE project (EU DG XIII TR1047)
aimed to develop a system that takes over vehicle control in case of real emergency, such
sudden illness. An international questionnaire survey carried out in the SAVE project
indicated that the driver population is reluctant to release vehicle control, but is willing to
accept it in emergency situations (Bekiaris et al, 1997). De Vos & Hoekstra (1997) focused
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on behavioural aspects of leaving the fully automated highway traffic lane. Apart from
studying the exit procedure, they also found that a short headway was considered less
comfortable and less accepted than a larger headway to vehicles-in-front. In follow-up
projects funded by the EU, many of these aspects are tackled with the aim to help
introducing ADAS (e.g. Wiethoff, 2001).
4. Conclusion
The potential of ADA systems is great, provided ADAS will be completely accepted and
widely introduced in the (near) future. For this, the ADA (sub)systems will all have to be
made as fail-safe as possible. Whenever the system fails, safety is to be determined by the
provisions taken to avoid serious accidents and in case of an accident the measures to
minimise the consequences for the passengers. Acceptability of ADAS is highly dependent
upon solid demonstration of these features. Acceptability is also found to be dependent of the
form in which ADAS applications are implemented. For the end-user the benefits should be
clear and preferably directly noticeable. For this reason comfort enhancing features stand a
better change than safety enhancement properties. Most drivers consider themselves at least
better drivers with respect to safe behaviour than average. Strict requirements for ADAS
applications by all stakeholders are safe (and valid) operation and reliability, false alarms are
not acceptable for end-users particularly.
Introduction of a fully automated highway system is technically possible now, but public
introduction on a large scale is at least waiting for the safety provisions and the public
acceptance, and also on proper legislation that clearly establishes responsibility and liability.
ITS America plans USA full deployment for 2005, comparable initiatives in Europe and
Japan will certainly close in as soon possible. In the meantime many (current, at the moment
of writing) projects such as the EU-projects ADVISORS and TRAVEL-GUIDE (both
running from 2000 to 2003) try to pave the way for introduction of ADAS and above all
acceptance of ADAS by stakeholders and community.
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